Authority, Autonomy, Legitimacy, and Justice
(Wrote this paper for my Political Philosophy Class. Had to compare John Rawls and Robert Paul Wolff. I know Wolff is not very sympathetic to capitalism, but he is just amazingly and sufficiently anti-state in this particular work, and destroys Rawls.)
The concept of authority has been present throughout history. Authority has been presumed in regards to morality, in the form of religious hierarchal structures. It has likewise been used in the realm of politics as a concentration of force within an organized state. Because of the nature of morality and political policy, there has been an inevitable overlap of moral authority into political authority, and political authority into moral authority. Political authority is often just the vehicle through which a moral authority is exercised. More often than not, the right of some individuals to claim authority over other individuals goes unquestioned. Certainly it would upset the sense of order that is in place if such sentiments of skepticism pervaded the law-abiding masses. There are, however, certain remarkable moments in history when man has been so boldly logical as to challenge the very root of any authoritative claim. We are led to the question of whether or not authoritative force could ever actually exist with moral legitimacy.
It is crucial to understand that the current mainstream paradigm of “left-wing” vs. “right-wing” is so misguided and oversimplified that it leads to a fundamental misinterpretation of where the true ends of the political spectrum lie and what is at the very root of their division. All political philosophy begins with either a commitment to or a complete refutation of social contract theory. In the realm of political philosophy, there are those whose theories depend on the validity of social contracts in order for their ideas to be morally justified and those who reject the validity of social contracts altogether. Without a social contract of some sort, there cannot be a legitimate moral justification for the existence of a state. The social contract excuses the surrendering of personal liberty in some cases, for the purposes of achieving perceived senses of “justice”, “fairness”, and “security”. Therefore, within the context of a social contract, you are only as free as the legislation advanced by your state allows you to be.
John Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” is heavily reliant on social contract. From the outset, it is presumed that his solutions to social problems would be applied to a constitutional democracy, or at least a system of a similar ilk. This premise presumes the capability of lawmakers to have a legitimate right to implement their interpretations of what types of laws are just. It also presumes that a democratic majority is qualified, by nature of having greater numbers, to impose their ideas of justice on the rest of society. Since these presumptions are made, it is therefore an obligation of the citizens to “play fairly”- to obey laws that they might see as unjust so as to preserve whatever sense of order, justice, and security the state does provide. To be fair to Rawls, he did outline instances where it would be just to disobey the state and not hold up your end of the social contract. However, upon examining the conditions under which such actions are justified, it could be argued that from the very inception of a state’s exertion of power, it could be seen by at least some in a society as morally imperative that they rebel against the state. This sentiment would not please Rawlsians, but nonetheless there is no valid philosophical reason for not subjecting the principle of “fair play” to the most strict scrutiny and skepticism possible.
In Robert Paul Wolff’s “In Defense of Anarchism,” he seeks to find a morally valid balance between personal autonomy and political authority. Is personal autonomy something that could ever be truly stamped from existence? Is political authority even real? Wolff explains that personal autonomy is man’s capacity and right to make decisions for himself. This is the most precious right of man and it is his obligation to take personal responsibility for his own actions. Furthermore, even when an outside authority commands a man to do something, it is the autonomous man, still existing no matter how convincing the illusion of the ruling authority’s legitimacy is, that chooses to take the actions he takes. There is literally no way, therefore, that any one man or group of men could truly subvert the will of another man to such an extent that they become an actualized replacement for his moral autonomy and personal responsibility.
Rawls claims that men have are obliged to “fair play” for the sake of justice, but Wolff sees this as inefficient in taking personal autonomy into account. Wolff argues that sometimes, it is necessary and morally virtuous for a man to comply with the orders of authority (be it a ruler or society as a whole). However, in doing so, the morally conscious man is not taking such actions as a valid recognition of the authority’s legitimacy. Rather, on some level, the man is invoking his own personal responsibility to examine a situation for himself and make decisions according to what will produce the most favorable results in his eyes; in his morally autonomous conscience. Even in the most obscene instances of a state exerting force on an individual to get him to comply, such as a tax collector holding a gun to a man’s head to get him to hand over all of his money to pay for a pair of golden underwear for the king, the individual is still in a position to fight back. A rational person would conclude that such an action would be foolish and result in definite negative outcomes.
Notice that at no point in this decision-making process is the legitimacy of the authority at hand even considered a factor. What is relevant in such instances is that a force currently exists, autonomy currently exists, and the two are in direct conflict with one another. Taking a step back, why don’t we challenge the legitimacy of the authority in this case? As political philosophers, Wolff argues, isn’t it essential that any kind of sacrifice of personal autonomy be scrutinized to the extreme? In doing so, it comes to light that there is no circumstance in which man has a legitimate right or actual ability to subvert the autonomy of any other man, no matter what the intentions are. Rather, what occurs in an implementation of state force is, at best, an institutional form of highly developed intimidation. No matter how intimidating and influential a state’s or even a society’s actions are; no matter how pervasive and dominant the “tradition” of bowing to authority and accepting social contracts is; it is still completely impossible for an individual’s autonomy to be legitimately deleted. Therefore, there is no such thing as true authority of human beings over one another.
It is inherently erroneous to presume that authority can be justified in its actions just by virtue of the fact that people cower in deference to its power. Power and intimidation are entirely irrelevant to actual legitimacy. In any society, there will be instances where the laws happen to coincide with justice. This does not make the legislators and enforcers themselves the source of justice. There will just as often (sometimes less so, sometimes more so) be instances where the laws happen to breed injustice. Once again, this does not make the legislators and enforcers themselves the source of injustice. Instead, it is the personal actions and moral consciousness of each individual partaking in a society that are the true roots of moral accountability. Justice is not subject to the beliefs of whatever political party is in power. Men are in charge of the interpretation of justice, not the creation of it. Therefore, society should be set up in such a way that personal autonomy is never suppressed by law. The only system of law that truly respects personal autonomy is not a constitutional democracy, but anarchy.
I happen to agree with Wolff on almost everything in this essay. The agnostic approach that he takes to government speaks to the core of my beliefs. The rejection of social contract theory is essential in assessing society from a fundamentally moral starting point. There are obviously some very challenging questions that could be posed to anarchists such as Wolff. Without state force, it is often feared that moral relativism will wreak havoc on society and turn us all into hedonistic animals. I believe that answers to questions of this nature have been outlined in the works of other anarchists, such as the father of Voluntaryism, Lysander Spooner and the father of Anarcho-Captialism, Murray Rotherbard. However, the burden is on Wolff to come up with explanations of how justice would be handled in his anarchistic society.
Perhaps the only weak point I see in Wolff’s argument is the fact that it stops at the abolition of the state and does not go on to explain the workings of a stateless society and how they would be preferable to the tyranny of governments. Questions of economic systems and interpersonal relationships are not addressed in this work and are thus open to interpretation and experimentation. This does not at all hamper the validity of the moral philosophy itself that leads to the abolition of the state; it merely poses challenges for the practical implications of the implementation of such a system. What is so important about this work is that we get to this point of exposing the illegitimacy of political authority. It is only from here that we can truly continue on a moral path of analyzing societies and determining what is just and how to achieve that justice.
